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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
William Thomas Faucher appeals from his judgment 0f conviction for two counts

0f sexual exploitation of a child by distribution of child pornography, two counts 0f sexual
exploitation of a child

LSD. He challenges

by possession 0f child pornography, and one count 0f possession of

his concurrent aggregate sentences

0f 25 years determinate, claiming

they are excessive and cruel and unusual punishment.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

Faucher had on his computer “several thousand ﬁles containing images of the
sexual exploitation of minors.”

A

(PSI, p. 4.1)

description of

some of

the images and

Videos can be found in the PSI, investigative reports, and sentencing transcript. (PSI, pp.
4-5; Conﬁdential Exhibits, pp. 15-20, 32-33, 38-39; 12/20/18 T11, p. 16, L. 10

2; p. 23, L. 9

—

p. 31, L. 14; p. 36, L.

22 —

p. 46, L. 15.)

The

several varieties 0f illegal drugs. (PSI, p. 4.)

sexual exploitation of a child (three

by

state

distribution

He was

—

p. 19, L.

also in possession 0f

charged Faucher with 21 counts 0f

and 18 by possession), possession 0f

LSD, possession 0f marijuana, and possession 0f ecstasy.

(R., pp. 65-72.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Faucher pled guilty to two counts of sexual
exploitation 0f a child

exploitation 0f a child

LSD. (9/28/18

by

Tr., p. 5, L.

not correspond t0

14 —p. 7, L. 14; p. 18, Ls. 9-1

The

district court

numbers of the PSI and
the page numbers on the

Citations to page

two counts 0f sexual

by possession of child pornography, and one count of possession 0f

22, L. 11; R., pp. 186-99.)

1

distribution of child pornography,

its

1; p.

—p.

imposed concurrent sentences of 25 years

attachments are to the electronic ﬁle and d0

original document.
1

20. Ls. 2-5; p. 21, L. 25

fixed on the distribution of child pornography convictions, 10 years fixed on the possession
of child pornography convictions, and one year fixed on the possession of LSD conviction.
(R., pp. 215-19; 12/20/18 Tr., p. 151, L. 18 – p. 152, L. 3.) Faucher filed a notice of appeal
timely from the entry of the judgment. (R., pp. 222-25, 228-32.)

2

ISSUES
Faucher

states the issues

0n appeal

Did Mr. Faucher’s sentence

1.

in Violation

as:

constitute cruel

and unusual punishment

of his rights under the Eighth Amendment and Idaho

Constitution?

Did the

2.

district court

abuse

its

discretion

When

it

imposed an

aggregate sentence 0f twenty—ﬁve years ﬁxed, upon Mr. Faucher

following his plea of guilty t0 two counts 0f possessing sexually
exploitative

material,

exploitative material,

two counts of distributing sexually
and one count 0f felony possession 0f a

controlled substance?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Faucher

failed t0

because his argument

show
is

that his sentence is cruel

and unusual punishment

not based 0n the proper legal standards applicable t0 his

claim?

2.

Has Faucher

failed t0

show an abuse of sentencing

discretion?

ARGUMENT
I.

Faucher Has Failed To

Show Gross

Disproportionalitv

Under The Relevant And

Applicable Constitutional Standard

A.

Introduction

Faucher’s crimes involved trafﬁcking in and possession 0f Videos and images 0f

young children being

(E 12/20/18

subj ected t0 sexual acts, often With exceptional

Tr., p. 130, L.

18

— p.

sadistic cruelty.

132, L. 19.) His concurrent sentences are for 25 years

determinate. (12/20/18 Tr., p. 151, Ls. 18-23.)

He

contends that his punishment

proportion to the gravity of the offense committed, and
brief, pp. 6-19.)

and

However, although Faucher correctly

is

cruel

is

out of

and unusual. (Appellant’s

articulates the relevant standard as

a comparison of the severity 0f the sentence t0 the gravity 0f the crime (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 6-8), he at

relies

no point provides any analysis based 0n

on mitigating

factors such as his age, his mental

abuse and his lack of a criminal record. (Appellant’s

of the United

States,

Rather, he

this relevant standard.

and physical

disabilities, his alcohol

brief, pp. 8-19.)

The Supreme Court

however, has foreclosed an argument that mitigating factors are

properly considered in a claim of cruel and unusual punishment outside the death penalty
context.

Faucher has failed t0 argue that the severity 0f the sentences

disproportional to the gravity 0f the crimes, and has therefore

shown n0

cruel

is

grossly

and unusual

punishment.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“Reviewing

courts,

0f course, should grant substantial deference t0 the broad

authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits 0f

punishments for crimes, as well as to the discretion that

trial

courts possess in sentencing

Solem

convicted criminals.”

minds might

differ as to the

V.

Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). “‘Where reasonable

sufﬁciency 0f time of conﬁnement, the discretion vested in the

sentencing court in imposing sentence will be respected.”

445, 485, 272 P.3d 417, 457 (2012) (quoting State

V.

State V.

Adamcik, 152 Idaho

Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145, 814

P.2d 401, 405 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State

V.

Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825

P.2d 482 (1992)).

The Sentences Are Not GrosslV Out Of Proportion To The Crimes

C.

The “Eighth Amendment’s protection

against excessive or cruel and unusual

punishments ﬂows from the basic precept ofjustice that punishment for a crime should be
graduated and proportioned t0 the offense.”

Kennedy

“Where

(2008) (brackets and internal quotations omitted).
disproportionate to a crime, the Eighth

Amendment

is

554 U.S. 407, 419

V. Louisiana,

a punishment

violated.”

its

analysis

Graham V.

by “comparing

Florida,

all

grossly

State V. Shanahan, 165

Idaho 343, 445 P.3d 152, 159 (2019). Where the defendant “challenges
term-of—years sentences given

is

the length of

the circumstances in a particular case” the court begins

the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.”

560 U.S. 48, 59-60 (2010). In the “rare case”

this

comparison leads t0

an “inference of gross disproportionality” the court should engage in a comparative
analysis 0f sentences

Only

if this

sentence

imposed

for similar crimes.

comparison “validates” the

deemed

cruel

and unusual.

constitution a criminal sentence

is

initial

Li. at

60

(internal quotations omitted).

assessment 0f disproportionality

Li. (internal quotations omitted).

cruel

is

“[U]nder our

and unusual punishment only When

it is

the

state

out of

proportion to the gravity of the offense committed, and such as t0 shock the conscience 0f

reasonable people.”

State V.

Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 394, 825 P.2d 482, 491 (1992)

The

(brackets and internal quotations omitted).

Amendment

state constitutional standard

and the Eighth

standard are “essentially equivalent.” Li.

Applying these standards shows
pornography, while

stiff, is

that a

ﬁxed 25 year sentence

for distributing child

not out of proportion to the gravity 0f the offense committed

such as t0 shock the conscience 0f reasonable people.

First, the

gravity 0f the offense

was

heavy. Faucher was not dabbling With pictures of naked adolescents; he was trafﬁcking in

Videos 0f very young children, including infants, being forcibly raped and sexually

The PSI reported

violated.

that a “signiﬁcant

number” 0f the computer ﬁles Faucher was

sharing “depicted particularly brutal rapes 0f infants and

district court

“children

— p.

children.” (PSI, p. 4.)

The

found that “a goodly share” of Faucher’s child pornography involved

who were victimized”

the suffering in those instances

L. 6

young

132, L. 19.)

in “cruel

is

and

sadistic kinds

of ways,” such that “inﬂicting

part of the sick pleasure” intended. (12/20/ 1 8 TL, p. 13

The record supports

1

,

the district court’s characterization 0f Faucher’s

crimes. (PSI, pp. 301-08.) Because the record shows truly horrifying crimes that Victimize
children, a 25 year sentence

Although Faucher

is

not grossly disproportionate t0 the crimes committed.

sets

forth the

correct gross

disproportionality

test—”The

m

reviewing court compares the crime committed and the sentence imposed t0 determine

Whether the sentence
Gra_zian,

is

grossly disproportionate” (Appellant’s brief, p. 7 (citing

144 Idaho 510, 517, 164 P.3d 790, 797 (2007))—he makes no effort to apply

it.

His argument contains no mention 0f the nature of the crimes he committed, the very thing
his sentence

must be compared

to.

Rather, he discusses only the mitigating factors he

believes apply in sentencing, such as age, mental disabilities, physical disabilities, and

alcohol use.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-19.) Although Faucher has articulated the correct

legal standard

sentence

is

he has made no attempt to apply

cruel

show

his

States has foreclosed Faucher’s argument.

In

it,

and therefore has

and unusual.

The Supreme Court of the United
Harmelin

V.

ﬁxed

sentence for possessing 672 grams of cocaine.

life

failed to

Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961 (1991), the Petitioner challenged his mandatory

One 0f the arguments Harmelin

presented in support 0f his claim that the sentence was cruel and unusual was that the
sentence

such

was

statutorily

imposed “without any consideration 0f so-called mitigating factors

as, in his case, the fact that

he had n0 prior felony convictions.”

argument, holding that although the Eighth

rejected this

individualized determination that punishment

death penalty
Li. at

is

proper, “there

is

is

The Court

Li. at 994.

Amendment

requires “an

appropriate” before imposition 0f the

n0 comparable requirement outside the capital context.”

995 (emphasis added).

The present case

is

outside the capital context. Therefore Faucher’s individualized

sentencing argument based 0n mitigating factors

is irrelevant.

He has

failed t0

show

disproportionality between his sentence and his crime because he has failed to argue

gross

such?

II.

Faucher Has Failed T0
A.

Show An Abuse Of Sentencing

Discretion

Introduction

The

district court ultimately

imposed aggregate sentences of 25 years ﬁxed on two

counts of sexual exploitation of a child by distribution 0f child pornography, two counts of

2

Even

if the mitigating factors

Faucher invokes were a proper part of the cruel and unusual

sentence analysis, Faucher has failed to
in the next

argument related

incorporated

by reference.

show gross

disproportionality for the reasons stated

to the district court’s

abuse 0f discretion, Which

is

hereby

sexual exploitation of a child

by possession of

possession 0f LSD. (R., pp. 215-19; 12/20/18
argues that the district court abused
brief, pp. 19-22.)

The

its

district court,

much

Tr., p. 151, L.

18

—

p. 152, L. 3.)

Faucher

discretion in light ofmitigating factors. (Appellant’s

however, imposed

mitigating circumstances, but found

Faucher does not discuss,

child pornography, and one count 0f

less

its

sentences with awareness of the

them outweighed by aggravating circumstances.

show

error, in the district court’s

balancing of

aggravating circumstances (which go unmentioned in his argument), and therefore has

shown n0 abuse 0f discretion.

B.

Standard

“When

Of Review

evaluating Whether a sentence

is

excessive, this Court considers the entire

length ofthe sentence under an abuse 0f discretion standard.” State V. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016). The “appellant has the burden 0f showing a clear abuse 0f

discretion.”

C.

I_d.

The Aggregate Sentences Of 25 Years For The Child Pornographv-Related
Convictions Was Within The District Court’s Discretion
“Generally,

‘must establish

When

that,

appealing a sentence as an abuse of discretion, the appellant

under any reasonable View of the

considering the objectives of criminal punishment.’”

facts, the

sentence

was excessive

State V. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605,

608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2019) (quoting State V. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 856, 26 P.3d 31, 39

(2001)).

“Those objectives are

and the public generally;

(1) protection

(3) the possibility

retribution for wrong-doing.”

I_d.

0f society;

(2) deterrence

0f rehabilitation; and

of the individual

(4)

punishment or

In this case the district court speciﬁcally considered the goals of sentencing and

— p.

applied the correct legal standards. (12/20/18 Tr., p. 128, L. 13

24 —

p. 151, L. 17.)

why

child pornography crimes are

The

district court also

harsh punishments. (12/20/18

The

list

damaging

T11, p. 130, L. 11

life

—

was somewhat reduced by unproven

p. 133, L., 11.)

—

(12/20/18 T11, p. 134, L. 17

—

135, L. 9.)

p.

p. 135, L.

however, was also reduced because

it

10

— p.

from many

Also mitigating was

136, L. 8.)

appeared that

The weight 0f

many of Faucher’s

(12/20/18 Tr., p. 135, L.

district court

weighed the following aggravating

Faucher lied about the nature 0f his crimes, minimized

their signiﬁcance, did not

accept responsibility, and showed n0 remorse. (12/20/18 Tr., p. 136, L. 9

The

on

8.)

Against these mitigating facts the
facts:

effect

This mitigation, however,

p. 134, L. 16.)

supporters were unaware of the scope and extent 0f his crimes.

10 —p. 136, L.

to appropriately

allegations of sexual abuse of children

Faucher’s community support. (12/20/18 TL,
this mitigation,

and subject

Who, apart from these crimes, has had a positive

(12/20/18 Tr., p. 133, L. 15

years previously.

to their Victims

0f those mitigators, including: Faucher’s age, health and previously

crime-free and productive
the community.

considered the nature of the crimes, including

considered the mitigating factors in the case, and articulated a

district court

non-exclusive

129, L. 10; p. 147, L.

district court

—

p. 137, L. 25.)

found that as Faucher was committing these crimes he expressed

“disturbing fantasies” that “involve rape 0r murder 0f children” and “desire t0 inﬂict

suffering

0n these children,” and thus

his reason for possessing

pornography went beyond the mere “sick desire
p. 138, Ls. 1-25;

@ﬂ

12/20/18 Tr., p. 16, L.

t0

and distributing the child

have sex with children.” (12/20/ 1 8

10—p.

19, L. 2; p. 23, L.

9—p.

Tr.,

31, L. 14;

p. 36, L. 22 – p. 46, L. 15; p. 48, L. 16 – p. 57, L. 7; p. 126, L. 18 – p. 128, L. 12
(prosecutor’s presentation of Faucher’s communications “scrupulously fair”).)

Also

aggravating was Faucher’s “willingness to involve people involuntarily, unwittingly,
unknowingly, in his sexual behavior (12/20/18 Tr., p. 139, Ls. 1-15) and that he did these
things despite being a Catholic priest (12/20/18 Tr., p. 139, L. 16 – p. 140, L. 7). After
weighing different psychosexual evaluations and making credibility determinations, the
district court concluded Faucher “is at the upper end of the moderate range of risk to
reoffend” and “less amenable than most sex offenders to treatment.” (12/20/18 Tr., p. 140,
L. 8 – p. 144, L., 21.)
Finally, the district court applied its findings regarding aggravating and mitigating
factors to the goals of sentencing, and concluded that protection of society, punishment,
and deterrence all supported imposing a lengthy incarceration. (12/20/18 Tr., p. 147, L. 24
– p. 151, L. 17.) Because the district court applied the correct legal standards to the facts
of this case to impose a sentence reasonable under the circumstances, it properly exercised
its discretion.
Faucher contends the district court abused its discretion because the sentence is
excessive. (Appellant’s brief, p. 19.) He first argues that his age and infirmity are
mitigating factors. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-23.) The district court treated them as such.
(12/20/18 Tr., p. 134, Ls. 7-16.) The district court limited the weight of such mitigation,
however, noting that, although Faucher’s age and infirmity would be a substantial (but not
complete) barrier to Faucher carrying out some of his fantasies on living children, they did
not prevent him from committing the child pornography crimes before the court, and would
not prevent him from doing so again. (12/20/18 Tr., p. 144, L. 22 – p. 145, L. 13; p. 148,
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L. 16 – p. 149, L. 14.) Faucher argues the district court’s reasoning was incorrect and
based on a “patently unreasonable” concern that one of the persons Faucher had
communicated with regarding his fetishes would travel from Brazil to Boise to assist in
carrying out Faucher’s fantasy. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 30-31.) It is a little difficult to
ascertain whether Faucher is talking about this case: in this case Faucher expressed an
interest in traveling to Thailand or Brazil to, with assistance, rape and possibly murder
children. (12/20/18 Tr., p. 38 L. 16 – p., 40, L. 4; p. 51, L. 10 – p. 52, L. 22.) As set forth
above, Faucher engaged in many fantasies about living out the sexual predations and
violence against children he so enjoyed viewing. The district court’s concern that he would
do so if he could manage to secure help is supported by the record. Faucher has shown no
abuse of discretion in the district court’s weighing of his age and health as mitigating
factors.
Faucher next relies on his alcohol abuse, despondency, and sense of isolation as
mitigation, again arguing that the district court unreasonably failed to give these things
their deserved weight. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 23-27.) While any of these things may lead
to poor judgment, the district court correctly pointed out that there was no established
“link” to child pornography. (12/20/18 Tr., p. 145, L. 14 – p. 147, L. 16.) On appeal
Faucher has also failed to explain why alcohol abuse, despondency, and sense of isolation
would lead a person, not otherwise so inclined, into seeking out sexually explicit and often
sadistic photographs and videos of infants. The district court correctly rejected these
factors as root causes of the crimes.
Faucher also faults the prosecutor for presenting the “salacious parts” of Faucher’s
text and chat conversations, pointing out that the conversations also included things

11

unrelated to child pornography and sexually abusing children. (Appellant’s brief, p. 27.)
However, Faucher’s statements about child sexual abuse and child pornography—as
opposed to history, Satanism, and living conditions—are more properly characterized as
“relevant” than “salacious.” The district court reviewed “the hundreds and hundreds and
hundreds of pages of chat or text conversations” in the record and concluded that “the
prosecution presentation of those comments was scrupulously fair.” (12/20/18 Tr., p. 126,
L. 5 – p. 127, L. 22.) Faucher has shown no clear error.
Faucher next asserts the district court “failed to give proper consideration to his
status as a first time offender.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 27-28.)

The district court

specifically noted this was Faucher’s “first criminal conviction of any kind” and he “is not
someone who has lived a life of a criminal or who is generally criminal minded” and this
“is certainly a point to consider in mitigation.” (12/20/18 Tr., p. 133, Ls. 15-21.) Faucher
does not articulate how this was not a “proper consideration” of his lack of a criminal
history.
Finally, Faucher points out his community support. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 28-29.)
He fails to address the district court’s finding that Faucher was not “remotely honest with
his supporters in the community” regarding his actions and the extent of his criminality,
which called into question whether these same people would support Faucher, and to the
same extent, “had they known the truth about what happened in this case.” (12/20/18 Tr.,
p. 135, L. 10 – p. 136, L. 18.)
Faucher contends that the district court abused its discretion in light of the
mitigating factors present. That the district court simply (and sometimes expressly) did
not give those factors the weight Faucher wants does not show error. Moreover, Faucher’s
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argument ignores the aggravating circumstances balanced by the
Faucher wishes

the

district

court

had balanced the

district court.

aggravating

That

and mitigating

circumstances differently does not show an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm the

district court’s

judgment.

DATED this 22nd day 0f October, 2019.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

KKJ/dd

13

